

RUSSIA AND THE WEST IN IRAN

the world. Between the fall of 1942 and the fall of 1944 more than 4,380,440 tons of war implements and goods from American factories were delivered to Russia through Iran. By their ingenuity and energy the Americans managed to increase fivefold the capacity of the Transiranian Railway. Nearly 150,000 vehicles and nearly 3,500 planes including 1,400 bombers were delivered to the Red Army.⁶

Such was the technical aspect of the army's operations in Iran. Some other aspects might well be considered—first of all, the problem of Soviet-American military intercourse and relations. General Connolly had one simple, though technically difficult task to accomplish, namely, to deliver the tools of victory to the Russians. This he did with competence and with legitimate pride in his achievement. To fulfill his task he had to co-operate with the Russians, and this co-operation was generally smooth. The role of the American army was primarily technical and not political. To outside observers Soviet-American military relations looked quite cordial. Mutual visits of Soviet and American commanders, banquets, concerts, and shows contributed to this impression. To what degree this intercourse influenced the political thinking of General Connolly's staff it is difficult to judge. Sometimes one would hear the opinion expressed by a high American officer, "The operations in Iran have shown that you can do business with the Russians, because they were prompt and precise in meeting their obligations." That such assumptions were somewhat naive was obvious. After all the Russians were on the receiving side, and it would have been suicidal for them to impede in any way the efficiency of supply

operations. If such statements might be interpreted as denoting a pro-Soviet attitude, examples of more critical thought about Russia were not lacking. Despite their military occupations many staff officers mingled freely with the diplomatic colony of Teheran and were received in Iranian homes. There they had ample opportunity to learn something more about the real state of affairs in Iran.

Because General Connolly's task was precise and clear, he represented anything that might have spoiled his good cooperation with the Russians. Thus he was opposed to the activity of the army intelli-

« U.S. Army Dispatch, *Persian Gulf Command*, Nov. as, 1944. See also the last issue of Aug. i, 1945, reviewing the whole work of the P.G.C.